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Cohort Changes in Social Security Benefits and Pension Wealth 
Abstract 
We utilize three sets of data resources—the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), linked Social 
Security earnings records of the HRS respondents, and publicly available pension plan 
descriptions—to study pension wealth accumulations among the recent HRS cohorts.  We 
document the trends in pension wealth over time and across cohorts during a period in which the 
economic consequences of the Great Recession were significant.  However, given that pension 
wealth of many respondents were imputed in earlier waves due to the lack of information about 
pension plan provisions, there is the question of how much of the changes in pension wealth 
should be attributed to errors in imputation.  The recently available pension plan descriptions 
from private employers’ Form 5500 filings and public employers’ websites, which improve the 
respondent-plan linkage over what was available in previous waves, allow us to examine this 
exact question.  In particular, we show that the newly available sets of information not only 
reduce the need for imputation, but also enable us to identify the plans not reported by HRS 
respondents in the survey and the retirement wealth associated with these plans.  Finally, we also 
test the validity of the earnings projection methods used to produce Social Security and pension 
wealth estimates in the HRS, and we end our report with a discussion over the pros and cons 
among the projection methods. 
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The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) creates the potential to follow changes in 
retirement preparation at midlife (ages 51-56) through the introduction of new cohorts every six 
years.  The cohort added in 2010 also included an expansion of the minority sample of HRS, 
with financial support from the Social Security Administration (SSA).  This new 2010 cohort 
coincides with the recent availability of private-sector pension plan descriptions provided online 
by the Department of Labor Form 5500 filings, substantially improving our ability to link 
respondents and the detailed features of their pension plans.  Additionally, linked Social Security 
data have also recently become available for the 2010 cohort.  We use these new data sources, in 
conjunction with HRS survey data, to measure pension and Social Security wealth, and to 
conduct sensitivity analyses of cohort changes and racial disparities to key assumptions used in 
their construction.   
We consider the implications of assumptions used in the construction of pension and 
Social Security wealth in the context of cohort change.  The primary estimates (weighted) are 
shown in Table I for individuals ages 51-56 at six-year intervals, corresponding to the entry of 
new cohorts into HRS.  Most readers will think “household wealth” is what we call “total wealth.”  
Total wealth increased from 1992 to 2004 then dropped sharply in 2010 for the cohort having 
experienced the Great Recession.  Despite financial losses, in 2010 for the first time, DC wealth 
exceeded DB wealth, reflecting the long-term trend away from DB plans in the private sector.  
Social Security wealth rose somewhat after 1998, due mainly to the increasing real value of the 
maximum taxable earnings and increasing labor force participation among women.  The real 
value of annuitized retirement wealth (Social Security plus DB) fell from 1998 to 2004 and again 
to 2010.  The real value of nonannuitized, tax-advantaged retirement wealth (DC plus IRA) rose 
steadily, but not fast enough to offset the decline in annuitized wealth.  The newly available plan 
document information from the Form 5500 database allowed us to obtain pension plan data for a 
much larger fraction of private-sector employers.  Along with the linked W-2 earnings data, we 
were able to estimate the retirement wealth not reported in the survey.  Accounting for wealth in 
the plans that the HRS respondents failed to report increased retirement wealth by about 10%. 
The decision to code all the matched DB plans found from the Form 5500 database was 
justified by the variation in plan generosity.  We show that, holding individual and job 
characteristics constant, there is substantial variation in plan wealth across and within sectors.  
Public sector plans tend to yield larger wealth1; among private sector plans, frozen plans and 
those taken over by PBGC had lower level of benefits compared to the others.  Hence, the newly 
available plan documents improved the quality of data in three dimensions: They reduced the 
need for imputation, they captured and preserved the variation in plan generosity, and they 
allowed us to identify wealth in plans not reported by HRS survey respondents. 
We explain each component of data used to perform our analysis in Sections I through IV.  
In Section V, we consider these trends at ages 51-56 across the distribution of lifetime income 
and for different racial/ethnic groups.  We start with the mean trend in retirement wealth over 
time by gender and ethnic groups.  We then use a variance decomposition model to assess the 
cohort changes across the wealth distribution.  In Section VI, we examine the validity of earnings 
projection used to estimate retirement wealth by comparing the earnings projection for 2010 used 
in 2004 and actual earnings data in 2010.  We also discuss how the errors in earnings projection 
affect our estimates of retirement wealth, as well as the pros and cons among various methods of 
earnings projection.  Section VII concludes. 
 
                                        
1 Contributions into public pension plans were not used in the comparison of public versus private sector plans. 
I. PENSION WEALTH IN DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 
Estimating the annual pension to be received from a defined benefit plan requires 
knowledge of the detailed provisions of the plan (e.g., the benefit formula) and the features of the 
worker’s employment history (e.g., years of service and final salary) on which the benefit 
depends.  Pension wealth is then the discounted value of these annual benefits.  HRS calculation 
of respondents’ DB pension wealth relies on external information about plan provisions and 
survey information about employment history.  In this section, we describe the procedures we 
followed to assemble this information (or to impute it when it was not available) and then to use 
it to calculate present values of pension wealth for various assumed retirement dates. 
A. Obtaining and Coding Plan Descriptions 
Identifying Employers.  The search for provisions of HRS respondents’ DB pension plans 
began with the respondent’s survey report of employer name, address, and phone number.  Each 
report was individually reviewed, and web searches and consultation of the business directory 
ReferenceUSA were used to determine accurate local and parent employer information.  
Multiple criteria were assessed including employer name, location, industry, and phone.  In 
addition, a fuzzy match algorithm (Wasi and Flaaen, 2015) was used to compare self-reports in 
the survey to employer information in an internal database of past survey reports of employers as 
well as previous Form 5500 filings.  Employer identity matches were found for 3,807 of the 
3,930 HRS respondents in 2010 who reported participating in a pension at their current employer 
and who were not self-employed. 
Finding Employer Plan Descriptions.  Most public sector plans have descriptions 
available online, though local variations within state-sponsored plans (e.g., teachers) require 
adjudication.  In previous waves, HRS has attempted to obtain private sector plan descriptions 
directly from employers (without identifying study participants), and indirectly by asking 
participants to obtain the information from their employer.  Success rates from both approaches 
have been low.  Beginning in 2008, the Department of Labor began posting detailed Form 5500 
filings.2  Form 5500 is an annual filing mandated by the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) to monitor the financial health of plans and is required of employers with more 
than 100 participants in a tax-advantaged retirement plan.3  Descriptions of eligibility, vesting, 
and benefit accrual rules are usually attached to the Form 5500 filing.  Public sector plans are not 
covered by ERISA; hence, they do not have corresponding Form 5500 filings. 
Retirement plans in the Form 5500 database can be uniquely identified by the sponsor 
EIN and plan number.  HRS had hoped to use EINs obtained in linked Social Security 
administrative records to facilitate this linkage.  However, the most recent linked records do not 
have actual EINs, only a scrambled version.  EINs publicly available on websites like 
ReferenceUSA were used, but the primary method of finding employers in Form 5500 databases 
was through name and address.  Once the employer was located in DoL’s Form 5500 database, 
we reviewed all the plans sponsored by that employer to identify those plans for which the 
corresponding HRS respondent appeared to be eligible.  We followed the similar procedure to 
determine the eligibility of respondents working in the public sector, using the plan descriptions 
we downloaded from their websites. 
Plan Types and Plan Coding.  We call a defined-benefit plan document “codable” if it 
contains sufficient information to determine whether a respondent is eligible for this plan, when 
                                        
2 A web-based interface of this database is located at https://www.efast.dol.gov/portal/app/disseminate. 
3 While only 12% of all private-sector plans have more than 100 participants, these plans accounted for 98% (85%) 
of all active participants in DB (DC) plans in 2010. See U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefit Security 
Administration (2012), Tables A1 and A1(a). 
the benefit will vest, and how the benefit is calculated upon retirement or separation.  After we 
found a codable plan document for a certain respondent, the plan was coded using a sophisticated 
coding tool that captures formulas and parameters for use in calculating benefits (Fang et al., 
2016).  Information in the documents that we found may not be consistent with the respondent’s 
self-report, and sometimes we were not able to find enough information to establish the 
respondent-plan link.  In these cases we assigned plan parameters by imputation. 
Due to resource constraints, we did not attempt to code DC plans.  Respondent self-reports of 
DC account balance were used in preference to a calculated balance, and imputed as needed (see 
Section II).  Cash balance plans are considered as DB plans under ERISA and in most cases 
required coding in order to calculate benefits (balance).  In our analysis, we also considered 
wealth in cash balance plans as DB wealth.   
Imputation of DB Plan Coding.  A respondent who reported being covered by a DB plan 
but for whom we could not identify a DB plan for which s/he was eligible became a “seeker”– 
the respondent needed a set of plan parameters from which benefits could be calculated.  For 
each “seeker,” we assigned a plan from the “donor” pool of coded plans as this respondent’s 
imputed DB plan.  Table II shows the composition of donor and seeker pools based on both 
survey response and the plans for which the respondent might be eligible. 
More specifically, we put all the respondents into bins constructed based on a hierarchy 
of sector (two categories: public versus private), union status (two categories: covered by a 
collected bargaining contract or not), education (five categories: less than high school, GED, 
high school, some college, and college or above), industry (19 categories), occupation (25 
categories), size of the parent company (four categories: less than 25, 25 to 99, 100 to 499, and 
500 or more), and tenure in the current job (6 categories: less than five years, five to 10 years, 10 
to 15 years, 15 to 20 years, 20 to 25 years, and 25 years and above). 
For the bins that had at least 5 respondents and at least one donor, each seeker in these 
bins took a random draw (with replacement) of donors in the same bin.  The drawn donor plan 
hence became the seeker’s “imputed” plan.  Bins that had less than five respondents or no donors 
were aggregated “upward” in the hierarchy until they had at least five respondents and a donor, 
and seekers in these bins were then assigned donor plans in the same manner.4 
B. Respondent Information Needed to Calculate Benefits 
Years of service and earnings are two of the most important factors that determine the 
level of benefit upon retirement in a DB plan.  Below we briefly explain how these measures 
were constructed for each respondent. 
Hire Date and Years of Service.  A participant’s hire date is important for determining 
plan eligibility and measuring years of service credit.  HRS respondents were asked about the 
date of hire at their current employer when the job/employer was reported for the first time in the 
survey.  HRS usually skips the date of hire question in later waves when the respondent reports 
working for the same employer and only re-asks the question every two or three waves for 
confirmation purposes.  When multiple measures of hire date were available, they can be 
inconsistent.  In this work, inconsistent reports of hire date were compared to Social Security 
earnings records when they were available.  When earnings records could not be used to resolve 
                                        
4 This rule was developed to avoid small bins. 
inconsistent reports, the earliest reported hire date was used to determine plan eligibility, while 
service credit was calculated from the latest reported hire date.5 
Earnings.  The Pension Estimation Program projected earnings forward from the 
interview year based on salary at time of interview and an assumed rate of earnings growth from 
the interview year.  To establish earnings on the pension-covered job we began with HRS 
employment section self-report data on weeks worked per year, hours worked per week, and 
hourly wage.   Missing data on weeks and hours were imputed based on adjacent waves.  If the 
hourly wage was missing, a series of rules were used to select and apply substitute measures of 
income.6 
Whenever the information from a different wave/year was used to fill in as the earnings 
in 2010, we adjusted these earnings to 2010 U.S. dollars using the following rule: 
• For the 2008 earnings, we applied a 4% increase for government sector and a 
2.5% increase for private sector; 
• For 2012 wage, we applied a 3% decrease for government sector and a 4% 
decrease for private sector. 
The motivation behind these rules, rather than using the wage growth rate assumed in the 
Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the OASDI Trust Funds, was that we wanted to 
                                        
5 Multiple hire dates could be the result of multiple spells with the same employer.  We surveyed the jobs/plans in 
which our respondents experienced multiple job spells.  Many plans did not specify the rules to determine eligibility 
and years of service for participants who had multiple spells with the same employer.  Among those that we could 
tell, however, using the earliest date for eligibility and the latest for service credit seemed to be a valid assumption. 
6 If the respondent was paid by salary, we used the annual salary reported in the HRS employment section.  If the 
respondent was paid piece-work or “other,” we used annual income in the prior calendar year as reported in the 
income section, provided the prior year job was the same as the current one.  If this information was not available, 
income was calculated from adjusted employment section measures of income in adjacent interview waves for 
respondents with the same job in the relevant wave.  Failing that, the current interview wave’s income section data 
regarding the past year’s income were used if the reported hire date was before 2009.  If none of these measures 
were available, income was imputed to be the median income of respondents paid in that method (salary, hourly, or 
“other”). 
account for the earnings growth at the individual level.  Since people tend to leave near their 
peak earnings and are replaced in the labor force by people at lower earnings on their life-cycle 
trajectories, the in-sample wage growth (which is the earnings growth at the individual level) is 
more appropriate than the SSA wage index or the long-term earnings growth rate assumed in the 
OASDI actuarial report (both are earnings growth of the whole population) for our purpose.7  We 
obtained the in-sample wage growth using the average earnings changes among the HRS 
respondents who stayed in the same jobs and had no missing earnings information between 2008 
and 2012.  The growth rates were calculated by sector to reflect different earnings trajectories 
between public and private sectors during and after the Great Recession. 
C. Calculation of DB Benefits 
Pension Estimation Program.  The Pension Estimation Program was used to calculate 
future benefits based on the coded plan parameters and formulas and the self-reported respondent 
characteristics (Fang, et al., 2016).  Benefit calculations were made for all DB plans for which 
the HRS 2010 respondent was eligible, regardless of self-report.  The current public release 
version of 2010 DB wealth is consistent with prior releases in that it only reports DB wealth for 
respondents who self-reported having a DB plan.  That calculation was made from the imputed 
DB plan if no matching plan was found at the respondent’s employer. 
Present Value (PV) Calculation.  The present value of benefit wealth from a DB plan was 
calculated as: 
                                        
7 The Pension Estimation Program had two options for earnings.  It either took earnings at the baseline year for 
everybody and assumed the same earnings growth rate across individuals and over time; or it took the full earnings 
history (from the date of hire to retirement) for everybody.  It did not, for example, allow in-sample earnings growth 
that differed across individuals.  We discuss the validity of earnings projections in Section VI. 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇0) = � 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇0𝑡𝑡 ∗ �1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 + 𝑟𝑟 �𝑡𝑡−𝑇𝑇0 ∗ 𝐵𝐵(𝑇𝑇0, 𝑡𝑡)119
𝑡𝑡=𝑇𝑇0
 
where: 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇0𝑡𝑡  is the probability of surviving for t years after retiring at age T0, conditional on 
being alive at T0 (computed using sex- and birth cohort-specific mortality tables8), COLA is the 
plan-specific or user-provided annual growth rate of nominal payment (for most plans COLA=0), 
r is the nominal interest rate (5.7%), and B(T0, t) is pension benefit in year t after the quit date.   
DB wealth estimates were calculated or imputed for each respondent at various 
“milestone” retirement ages (T0).  The calculations assumed a real interest rate of 2.9% and an 
inflation rate of 2.8% according to the intermediate economic assumption in the 2010 version of 
the Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the OASDI Trust Funds.  To facilitate the 
comparison, the present values were then discounted or inflated to 2010 U.S. dollars. 
Values Corresponding to Different Possible Dates of Retirement.  Present values of pension 
wealth were calculated or imputed at eight different retirement (separation) ages: 60, 62, 65, 70, 
the plan’s stated early retirement age, the plan’s stated normal retirement age, the respondent’s 
own expected retirement age, and as of the end of 2010. 
At any given age, the Pension Estimation Program has three sets of wealth PVs: PV of 
early retirement benefits per plan language, PV of normal retirement benefits per plan language, 
and PV of benefits that are already vested (i.e., “vested and deferred”).  In a given specific age-
year, the PVs at early/normal retirement age would be zero for the years when the respondent 
was not yet eligible for early/normal benefits.  Similarly, the PV of vested and deferred benefits 
would be zero if the benefits were not vested yet.  In our calculation, we defined the maximum 
                                        
8 We used the cohort mortality table as of 2010 provided by the SSA. 
among these three numbers at a given age as the wealth at that age; i.e., we assumed that 
respondents would choose the provision that yielded the largest benefit payments. 
The DB pension wealth estimate at age 60 is the present value of all future cash flows 
that the respondent will receive if she or he retires on the 60th birthday.  For respondents who are 
younger than 60 in 2010, this definition is straightforward.  For the respondents older than 60, 
however, the wealth at age 60 is defined as the present value of all the future cash flows from 
2010 onward assuming that the respondent has retired at age 60.  In other words, we excluded all 
the benefits that had been paid in our calculation.  Pension wealth at age 60 would be missing if 
the respondent was older than 60 when the current job started, and it would be zero if the benefits 
were not vested yet at age 60.  We defined and calculated the wealth estimates at ages 62, 65, and 
70 similarly. 
Pension wealth at the early retirement age is the benefit wealth when a respondent initially 
becomes eligible for early retirement benefit.  Empirically, in a Pension Estimation Program 
output that chronologically lists the benefits at each retirement/quit age, this would be the first age 
when the PV at early retirement age becomes non-zero.  We also provided the corresponding age 
in the public release of the pension wealth estimates file.  Note that the early retirement age is 
defined at the person-plan level.  It could differ across respondents in the same plan if, for 
example, the retirement age eligibility is determined by a combination of age and years of 
service.  We defined and calculated the PV at normal retirement age in a similar manner. 
PV at the expected retirement age is the pension wealth at the expected retirement age 
reported by the respondent in the 2010 HRS interview.  In the survey, such dates were reported 
at the pension plan level.  We aggregated the measure to job level by picking the first retirement 
date reported in the plans associated with that specific job.  If the self-reported expected 
retirement age was missing (including “don’t know” and “refuse”), we imputed it using the 
nearest neighbor matching.  If the imputed expected retirement age was smaller than the 
respondent’s age in 2010, we assumed that the respondent expected to retire at the end of 2010.  
In other words, we assumed expected retirement age to be greater than or equal to the current age 
as of 2010.  For respondents who were younger than 80 as of 2010, we also capped (top-coded) 
the expected retirement age at 80.  For the respondents who were older than 80 as of 2010, we 
assumed they expected to retire in the end of 2010.  Note that, if the benefits were not vested as 
of the expected retirement age, the PV at expected retirement age would be zero.  We also 
provided the expected retirement age (modified, if necessary, according to the above rules) as 
well as an indicator of whether the expected retirement age was imputed in the pension wealth 
estimates file. 
Finally, following Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (Gustman et al., 2010a; b), we 
define PV in the end of 2010  as a proration of wealth PV at the expected retirement age based 
on the ratio of the respondent’s years of service as of 2010 to the respondent’s years of service at 
the expected retirement age.  Hence, it is the linearly-approximated portion of benefits at 
expected retirement date that the respondent has earned based on years of service as of 2010.  It 
is, therefore, not exactly equal to the benefits someone would receive if s/he stopped work at the 
end of 2010: In some cases the PV might be zero if the respondent quit working in 2010 because 
vesting had not yet occurred; and in many cases, DB benefit accrual is greatest at the end of 
career (just the opposite of progressive Social Security benefits).   
The other limitation of the GST approach to prorating benefits is the reliance on expected 
age at retirement.  The expected retirement age given by a young respondent may not be well-
considered in light of the financial incentives of the plan.  Indeed, in some cases, this wealth is 
considerably less than wealth at 62 or 65.  In this paper, we constructed prorated DB wealth 
based on the full spectrum of possible retirement ages.  For each estimate in the public file (age 
62, age 65, normal retirement age, and expected retirement age), we calculate linearly prorated 
wealth at age in 2010.  We take the second-highest prorated value among these estimates. 
D. Variations in Plan Generosity and Importance of Imputation 
A justification for actually coding all these DB plans (rather than just using a “generic” 
plan) is the variation in plan generosity.  Are the variations in DB plan wealth across respondents 
driven by the variations in generosity of their plans, or do they simply reflect the variations in 
their earnings and years of service?  In the extreme scenario where all the DB plans have similar 
provisions, identifying and coding the plans that HRS respondents are eligible for does not add 
much value to the understanding of pension wealth and retirement preparation. 
To isolate the effects of individual characteristics (namely earnings and seniority) versus 
plan generosity on plan wealth, we fed a stylized earnings profile into all the plans coded in 2010.  
This “typical” HRS respondent was a man born in 1954, started the current job in 1989, earned 
$48,600 as of 2010 (the median earnings among the HRS respondent who were working as of 
2010), and quit working at age 65.  We then calculated the wealth of this stylized respondent 
under each plan.  The result is shown in Figure I. 
It is clear from Figure I that, holding earnings and seniority constant, there is substantial 
variation in plan wealth.  Public sector plans tend to yield higher wealth than private sector 
plans.9  The difference at the mean is about $150,000.  Additionally, many private sector plans 
                                        
9 This does not necessarily mean public employees get “better deals” in their pension plans.  Many of the public 
sector plans are contributory, so public employees may have already paid into these plans.  Also, since many public 
employees are exempted from Social Security, a higher level wealth in a public DB plan per se does not necessarily 
indicate better retirement preparation.   
have been frozen or transformed into cash balance plans.  As Figure II shows, frozen plans 
(including the plans that have stopped accruing benefits or have become cash balance plans) 
overall yield less wealth than nonfrozen plans in the private sector.  About 30% of the private 
sector HRS respondents whose plans were coded in 2010 have frozen plans, and frozen plans on 
average yield $50,000 less than nonfrozen plans in the private sector under our stylized earnings 
profile.  Hence, Figures I and II suggest that, in order to assess the retirement preparation, it is 
important to match HRS respondents to the correct plans that they have. 
II. PENSION WEALTH IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 
To be consistent with earlier waves of pension wealth estimates, we constructed pension 
wealth in defined contribution (DC) plans where respondents reported having such plans, relying 
on self-reported account balances from the current job as of the 2010 survey.  A respondent 
could report multiple accounts balances from the same job.10  The total DC wealth was computed 
as a sum of all accounts from current job in 2010.  If some of these amounts were missing, they 
were imputed.   
Imputation of Account Balance in DC Plans.  When the account balance was not reported, 
we imputed the respondent’s DC account balance using a variation of the nearest neighbor 
matching method.  The HRS uses unfolding brackets to obtain information on dollar values for 
which the respondent does not report an actual value.  We first aggregated the account balance 
up to the respondent level for those who had more than one DC account, accounting for both 
actual and bracketed answers.  For example, if a respondent reported $100K and $25K in each 
account, her total balance was $125K.  If a respondent reported a balance of $120K in the first 
                                        
10 In plans that have both DB and DC features, the term “DC account balance” pertains to the balance in DC 
component of such plan. 
account and “between $20K and $50K” in the second, she was considered to have a bracketed 
answer between $140K and $170K.  If the report was “between $20K and $50K” in the first 
account and “between $0 and $20K” in the other, the balance was between $20K and $70K.  If 
the reports were “between $20K and $50K” and “DK,” the combined balance was “more than 
$20K.” 
We identified “nearest neighbors” by assigning predicted values of DC balance.  
Prediction equations were estimated on those respondents who reported cardinal values for all 
DC plans.  Different prediction equations were estimated for each gender.  We regressed the 
logarithm of respondent’s DC account balance in 2010 on: respondent’s  age,  three  marital  
status  indicators  (married,  divorced, or widowed), eight region of residence dummy variables, 
two dummy variables for minority (non-Hispanic black or Hispanic), three education categories, 
nativity, years of work experience, a union status indicator, a dummy variable indicating whether 
respondent also has a DB plan, a health insurance indicator, a home ownership indicator, 
logarithm of annual wage for the current job, logarithm of total household income, and 
occupation and industry indicators for the current job.  For the logarithm of account balance, 
wage, and income variables, we used the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, ln (�𝑦𝑦2 + 1 +
𝑦𝑦), rather than ln (𝑦𝑦), so the observations with zero account balance, earnings, or income were 
not dropped.  Based on the coefficients from this regression, we calculated a “predicted” account 
balance for all respondents, including those whose answers were actual numbers, bracket 
numbers, or missing.  The sample was then sorted by this predicted account balance. 
In the next step, a “nearest neighbor” was found for each respondent whose reported DC 
account balance was in brackets or missing.  The actual account balance of the nearest neighbor 
was assigned as the imputed account balance for a respondent whose report was in brackets or 
missing.  For a respondent whose reported DC account balance was missing, finding a nearest 
neighbor is straightforward.  It was simply the respondent who reported an actual number in the 
account balance and had a predicted account balance adjacent to that of the respondent who 
needed an imputed balance.  For a respondent whose report balance was in brackets, it was the 
most adjacent respondent whose actual account balance fell in the same reported bracket of the 
respondent who required imputation.  That is, the “nearest neighbor” of a respondent who had a 
reported balance of “between $20K and $50K” was the respondent with the most adjacent 
predicted balance among those who had an actual balance between $20K and $50K.11  In this 
way, the information in bracketed answers was preserved in the imputation process. 
III. COMPARING RESPONDENT REPORTS AND EMPLOYER  
MATCH INFORMATION 
The 2010 HRS public release of current job pension wealth estimates are based on 
methods developed by GST for 1992-2004.  In particular, because of the rather unsuccessful 
efforts to match respondents to private employer pension plans, those methods rely on 
respondent reports of pension coverage and plan type.  If no employer match was obtained, or no 
matching plan found for that employer, the value of the plan was imputed.   
Table III demonstrates the value of the Department of Labor’s posting of Form 5500 
records.  In both 2004 and 2010, the HRS was able to match most public-sector workers to their 
plan information because public employers post their own plan information online.  In 2004, 
only about one in three private sector pension-covered workers was successfully matched 
                                        
11 For example, respondent A reported a DC balance “between $20K and $50K.”  The respondent who had the 
closest predicted balance reported DC balance $10K, and the respondent who had the second closest predicted 
balance had a reported balance of $35K.  This $35K respondent is considered as the “nearest neighbor” for the 
purpose of this imputation, and the imputed DC balance for respondent A is $35K. 
through requests made of employers.  In 2010, more than 90% were matched through the DoL 
website. 
The higher matched rate likely also improved data quality by reducing the need for 
imputation.  Table IV splits respondents into two groups: those whose plans were matched and 
coded both in 2004 and 2010, and those whose plans were matched and coded in 2010 but not in 
2004 (so their pension wealth estimates in 2004 were imputed).  The former group is further split 
by sector.  To eliminate the variations in other factors that affect DB wealth (for example, 
respondents who stayed in the same job between 2004 and 2010 would have gained six years of 
seniority) other than plan provisions, the first two rows in Table IV were calculated by feeding 
the same 2004 job and individual characteristics into 2004 coded plans (the first column) and 
into 2010 coded plans as if they were coded in 2004 (the second column).  If there were no 
change in coded plan provisions, numbers in these two columns would be identical.  Hence, the 
change in wealth in the first two rows reflects changing plan provisions, as private plans change 
more often than public plans.  The largest mean absolute difference in the last row is expected.  
Since respondents in the last row had their wealth imputed in 2004, any noise in the wealth 
estimates due to imputation would show up in the mean absolute difference.  Assuming that 
plans in the second and third rows were otherwise similar, imputation on average added $40,000 
of error ($131,308-$90,064) into plan wealth in 2004 for each respondent.  The high match rate 
in 2010 alleviates this issue by reducing the need for imputation. 
The very high rate of employer matching also allowed us for the first time to compare 
systematically the wealth in plan types reported by respondents with the wealth in plan types 
offered by employers for which that respondent is eligible.  Table V shows the estimates of 2010 
pension wealth, in total amount reported by all HRS respondents age 51-56 in 2010 in the survey, 
according to whether we relied on respondent reports of plan type, as was done in the public 
versions of HRS pension wealth back to 1992, or instead relied on plans offered by employers to 
which the respondent can be matched.  Imputations were used to estimate DB wealth when a 
respondent reported DB but no DB was matched, and when a respondent did not report a DC but 
was matched to one.  It is comforting that half or more of total pension wealth of all types was in 
plans for which the respondent and employer match agreed on the plan type.  Pure plan switches, 
where the respondent said DB and the employer only offered DC (or vice versa), accounted for a 
very small part of the total wealth, and the totals were not very different whether we rely on 
respondents or employers.  Cases in which the respondent reported both types of plans but can 
only be matched to one or the other account for a slightly higher share of pension wealth, and the 
net change from replacing the respondent’s report with employer data was to reduce wealth by 
about $30 million out of nearly $600 million total, or about 5%.  A larger impact is seen in cases 
where a respondent reported only one type of plan but was found to be eligible for both.  If we 
were to add all the plans for which the respondent appears to be eligible (but did not herself 
report) it would add about $100 million in pension wealth in 2010, or about 15%.  Slightly more 
of this came from DC plans than from DB plans.  Adding DC wealth in all cases where the 
respondent was eligible for a plan but did not report participating in it is almost surely an over-
adjustment, as respondents might choose not to contribute to plans that required a worker 
contribution as a condition for participation. 
Determining which estimate of pension wealth is closest to the truth would require 
accurate data on the plan type(s) of each HRS respondent.  Such data are not available.  However, 
the W-2 records contained in the linked HRS-SSA administrative records, which list the amount 
of tax-deferred contribution into qualified defined contribution plans (see Dushi and Honig, 2015 
for a detailed discussion),12  are helpful in some cases.  The presence of tax-deferred contribution 
in the W-2 is good evidence of current contribution (participation) in a DC plan.  The converse is 
not true.  That is, someone who is not currently contributing may nevertheless have wealth in a 
DC plan at their current employer.  Linked SSA administrative records also provide no 
information on whether an individual participates in a DB plan.  Another limitation of 
administrative records is that they are only available for respondents who provided consent.  
About half of all workers in HRS 2010 had provided consent as of the most recent linkage.   
The W-2 evidence tends to support the employer match estimates for DC wealth.  Those 
estimates added about $57 million in DC wealth to respondent reports (see Table V).  Imputing 
values to plans implied by the W-2 deferred compensation field and adjusting the total for the 
rate of Social Security consent would add about $60 million to respondent reports.  While the 
employer match and W-2 link seem to agree well in terms of overall “missing” DC wealth at 
about 10% or less, they do not necessarily agree well at an individual level.   
Table VI shows the percent of cases with deferred compensation in their 2010 W-2, 
among those with linked administrative records.  It reaches only as high as 75% among cases 
where respondents report DC plans and we match them to DC plans for their employer, so in all 
likelihood 25% of DC plans are missed by the linked W-2 data alone.13  When respondents and 
employers agreed that the only plan is a DB plan, the administrative data finds deferred 
compensation nearly 12% of the time.  The total value of such plans is $1.6 million (based on our 
                                        
12 We only include contributions into 401(K) and 403(B) plans for the purpose of this paper. 
13 More DC plans are missed in the public sector than in the private sector, likely due to how state-level plans are 
treated for tax purposes.  Public employees who are not covered by Social Security pay mandatory contributions into 
their state pension plans, which are categorized as 401(a) for tax purposes regardless whether DC options are 
available or not.  Neither employer nor employee contributions into 401(a) plans are reported in W-2.  As a result, 
participation into DC options under such state-level plans will not show up in W-2 even if employee contributions 
are required. 
imputations for DC plans not reported by respondents).  If we inflate on the assumption that the 
people without linked administrative data had the same rate, that would come to $3.2 million.  
Among cases that reported a DC but could only be matched to a DB, 62% had deferred 
compensation in their W-2 record, and this would come to $10.5 million if fully imputed.  
Finally, the W-2 records indicate deferred compensation for some people who reported no 
participation at all.  This comes to $13 million in total value.  So if we were to take all the cases 
of W-2 deferred compensation as valid DC plans and impute values to them and to the similar 
respondents without administrative linkage, we would add about $27 million more to the total 
value of DC plans, about a 4% increase over what the survey estimates.  
IV. MEASURES BASED ON LINKED SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 
A. Social Security Wealth at Ages 51-56 
The public versions of the HRS Social Security wealth data are described in Fang and 
Kapinos (2016).  The public measures were calculated for persons with linked data, and imputed 
for others.  We made several modifications for the goals of this paper.  First, sample restrictions 
imposed by SSA limit the public versions to persons who had not yet claimed SS benefits by the 
survey date.  That has the potential to significantly distort analyses of cohort change, because the 
fraction of 51-56 year olds on SSDI has doubled from 1992 to 2010, from 4% to 8%.  In this 
report we imputed SS wealth for those not included in the public SS wealth files.  In the future 
we intend to calculate it directly from SS records for those who are linked, and make those 
estimates of Social Security wealth available. 
The second modification was to adjust the SS wealth estimates to remove the wealth due 
to projected future earnings, so the SS wealth only reflects the earnings history upon the 
respondents’ entry into the HRS in order to facilitate the comparison at baseline years across 
cohorts.  We began by calculating wealth without projected earnings for those in the linked 
sample.  We then calculated pro-rating shares for each individual as the ratio of wealth based 
only on past earnings to wealth assuming work to age 62, using an income projection method 
based on last five years of earnings from the  W-2 (see Fang and Kapinos, 2016).  These shares 
were then imputed for the full sample, and adjusted wealth is calculated for everyone.  We only 
include the benefits based on the respondent’s own earnings history and exclude spousal and 
survival benefits. 
B. Lifetime Earnings at Ages 51-56 
In order to evaluate retirement savings, and to permit analysis across the income 
distribution, we constructed measures of true lifetime earnings using detailed earnings in the 
linked administrative records.  The linked administrative data for covered earnings begin in 1951, 
but detailed earnings, which include earnings from jobs not covered by Social Security, and 
earnings above the cap on FICA-taxable earnings, begin in 1978.  They thus represent a different 
part of the life cycle for different cohorts.  For the cohort 51-56 in 1992, the detailed earnings file 
covered earnings from about age 40.  For the cohort 51-56 in 2010, it covered earnings from 
about age 22.  We imputed earnings not subject to FICA tax prior to 1978 based on that 
individual’s ratio of detailed earnings to covered earnings in 1978-91, and other characteristics.14  
                                        
14 Given the relatively low level of FICA taxable earnings cap in earlier years, it was not uncommon to have covered 
earnings top-coded before 1978.  Among the person-year records that had non-zero earnings in our data, 19% were 
top-coded in 1951.  That number slowly increased to 34% in 1971 and gradually declined to 20% in 1977.  Kopczuk, 
Saez, and Song (2010) used quarterly earnings data and found that less than 1% of the workers reached the FICA 
cap in the first quarter of the year.  For this small group of workers, they imputed the earnings in the first quarter 
assuming earnings followed a Pareto distribution and multiplied it by four as the total yearly earning.  For the rest of 
person-year records that were top-coded, they imputed the total yearly earnings as four times the largest quarterly 
earnings before the cap was hit within a person-year.  We were not able to adopt their strategy because our records 
were at the yearly level.  We hence used the ratio between covered and total earnings after 1978 and assumed the 
We also discovered some problems with the linked data, in that detailed earnings are not 
available for all linked persons in all years, and in some cases detailed earnings are below 
covered earnings.  We, therefore, used covered earnings in place of detailed earnings when 
covered earnings exceeded detailed earnings. 
A second challenge to using administrative earnings data for this purpose was that 
different respondents signed consents at different dates and these different consents require that 
linkage end at different dates.  Because some cohort members entered the study (and consented 
to linkage) as younger spouses prior to the year in which their birth cohort became age-eligible, 
we do not always have complete earnings data up to the year of age-eligibility.  Everyone in the 
linked data has data to at least 1991.  For people with any linked data, we imputed earnings in 
the years between the end of linked data and their cohort’s year of entry into HRS in three pieces, 
1992-97, 1998-2003, and 2004-2009.  For each six-year period we constructed estimates of 
earnings reported in HRS.  We sorted the sample by birth cohort and whether or not there were 
positive earnings in HRS.  We then estimated regression models for linked earnings separately 
for each group in each interval using HRS earnings, W-2 earnings from 1978 to the beginning of 
the interval, age, education, and gender as predictors.  R-squared was generally between 0.5 and 
0.6.  We then predicted values for everyone who remained in HRS over that interval.  We sorted 
on predicted earnings within cohorts and whether or not there were positive earnings in HRS and 
used nearest-neighbor imputation.   
Finally, we imputed a lifetime earnings value for everyone in our cohorts of interest, but 
not in the linked administrative data, again using nearest neighbor.  The previously imputed 
                                                                                                                               
ratio stayed the same before 1978, in order to address both the top coding issue, as well as the switch between 
covered and uncovered jobs.  The ratio was individual-specific. 
estimates of Social Security wealth were used in this imputation to ensure some consistency 
between the two. 
V. COHORT CHANGES IN LIFETIME EARNINGS AND RETIREMENT WEALTH 
A. Trends at the Mean 
Figure III shows the cohort changes in the mean levels of lifetime earnings and retirement 
wealth over time.  We included Social Security wealth, DB wealth,15 DC account balance, and 
IRA as retirement wealth, as they are expected to generate income upon retirement.  For this 
reason, the value of other household assets was excluded.16  The two vertical axes were drawn at 
a 4:1 scale (roughly the ratio of lifetime income to assets in 1992 and 1998), so that at any 
horizontal line, the amount of lifetime earnings (in 2010 USD) is always four times of the 
retirement wealth (also in 2010 USD).  Furthermore, if the retirement wealth trend is steeper 
(flatter) than the lifetime earnings trend, it indicates retirement wealth grows faster (slower) than 
the lifetime earnings. 
It is clear from the graph that retirement wealth did not keep pace with lifetime earnings 
overtime.  Among those who were age 51-56, retirement wealth has consistently decreased 
relative to lifetime earnings since 1992.  While lifetime earnings kept growing for the younger 
cohorts, retirement wealth actually decreased after peaking in 1998.  In the bottom panel of 
Figure III, we added the retirement wealth found through plan documents but not reported by the 
                                        
15 “DB wealth” here includes prorated wealth from current job (to reflect the benefits that already accrued) as well as 
the wealth in dead/dormant plan from past jobs.  The latter component was brought in from the updated pension 
sequence as in Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2010a).  
16 The value of household asset, in which the biggest component is the house itself for the majority of the population, 
largely stayed at a same level over time (Table I), except for the housing boom in the mid-2000.  Including 
household asset hence will not change the trend in retirement wealth but could potentially overstate the present value 
of the retirement income. 
respondents in 2010 onto the graph (the calculation is shown in Table V).  That raised the 
retirement wealth for the 2010 cohort to the 2004 level, but still at a much lower level in absolute 
and relative terms comparing to the earlier cohorts.  Hence, although the newly available data 
and method allowed us to better capture the pension wealth of HRS respondents in 2010, 
reporting errors seemed to only explain a small portion of the cohort changes at best. 
Figure IV shows the changes by gender.  Lifetime earnings for men peaked in 2004, and 
lifetime earnings for women have been increasing over time.  Despite the increased earnings, 
however, the retirement wealth did not grow as fast (for women) and even declined (for men).  
Figure V shows the changes by race.   The earnings and retirement wealth across racial groups 
peaked at various times, but the patterns were largely the same.  Regardless whether we look at 
the whole sample, by gender, or by racial groups, retirement preparation among the American 
near-elderly (at least when measured in financial wealth) seems to have weakened since the turn 
of this century. 
The trends in each component of the retirement wealth are shown in Figure VI.  The shift 
from DB to DC over time is clear; however, the increase in DC and IRA combined has not been 
able to offset the decline in DB wealth.  Social Security wealth slightly increased overtime.  
Hence, Social Security is playing a more important role in the retirement wealth of the younger 
cohort.  This conclusion holds across gender and racial groups (Figures VII and VIII).  If 
anything, racial minorities were more adversely affected by the decline of defined benefit plans; 
as a result, racial minorities in the recent cohorts will have to rely more on Social Security than 
their earlier peers. 
B. Cohort Changes along the Distribution  
We further explored how the decline in retirement wealth affected the population across 
the earnings and wealth distribution.  The policy implication likely will be different if the decline 
in retirement wealth was a mean-shift rather than, for example, concentrated on a certain part of 
the distribution.  Additionally, to the extent that the composition of population ages 51-56 has 
changed over time,17 we also wanted to differentiate the change in retirement wealth 
accumulation from the change in population composition. 
To do so, we used the semiparametric variance decomposition method developed in 
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996, hereafter DFL).  In addition to decomposing the changes in 
retirement wealth into the “compositional effect” (change in the distribution of retirement wealth 
that can be attributed to the change in the distribution of population characteristics) and the 
“structural effect” (change that cannot be attributed to the changing population characteristics) 
(Fortin et al., 2011), the DFL decomposition also allows the magnitude of change to vary across 
the whole distribution.  In this paper, we omit the technical details of the decomposition and only 
present the steps that led our findings. 
We focused our analysis on the cohort changes between 1998 and 2010, the period during 
which the retirement wealth declined significantly according to Figures III through VIII.  The 
three parts in Figure IX shows the decomposition of changes in retirement wealth in 1998-2004, 
2004-2010, and 1998-2010.  The top-left part of the 1998-2004 graph has two curves: the 
distribution of retirement wealth in 1998 (maize line) and a “weighted” distribution of retirement 
wealth in 1998 (blue line).  The blue distribution is weighted in a way that the distribution of 
                                        
17 The population is becoming more educated and racially-diverse, and women also have higher levels of labor force 
participation.   The imputed lifetime earnings should capture some, but not all, of the variations associated with the 
compositional change. 
sample characteristics in 1998 is the same as that of 2004.18  In other words, the blue distribution 
is how the retirement wealth would have been distributed in 1998 had the distributions of HRS 
sample characteristics stayed the same in 1998 and 2004.  In the top-right part, the maize line is 
the distribution of retirement wealth in 2004, and the blue line is the same weighted 1998 
distribution as in the top-left part.  If, after adjusting for the changes in sample characteristics, 
the 1998 and 2004 distributions were identical, the maize and blue lines should overlap in the 
top-right panel.  Any deviation between the two lines indicates the changes in the distribution of 
retirement wealth that cannot be attributed to the population change overtime.  The difference 
between these two lines is presented in the bottom-left part.  It would have been a horizontal line 
at zero had the two lines in the top right panel perfectly overlapped.  However, the bottom-left 
panel in the 1998-2004 graph shows that the distribution of retirement wealth somewhat 
“polarized” between 1998 and 2004.  In 2004, the age 51-56 population was more likely to have 
retirement wealth at lower part of the distribution (logarithm of wealth around 9 and 11) as well 
as the higher part (logarithm of wealth around 13), but less likely to have wealth in between 
(logarithm of wealth around 11 and 13), compared to the population in 1998.  The bottom right 
panel is the same as the bottom-left panel but without taking logarithm, which shows the same 
polarization—a larger mass shifted to the lower end of the distribution while a smaller mass 
shifted upward from 1998 to 2004. 
The interpretations of the other DFL decompositions graphs are similar.  In the 2004-
2010 graph, we show that the shift in retirement wealth was downward.  In the final graph, 1998-
2010, the decline in retirement wealth is clear.  Overall, those who were age 51-56 in 2010 were 
more likely than their 1998 counterpart to have retirement wealth between $20K and $200K 
                                        
18 The sample characteristics considered include: gender, race, level of education, marital status, region of residence, 
labor force participation, disability, home ownership, and lifetime earnings. 
(logarithm of wealth between 10 and 12), but less likely to have wealth between $200K and 
$1.2M (logarithm of wealth between 12 and 14).  While the retirement wealth of the 2010 cohort 
likely was hurt during the Great Recession and likely will rebound, the magnitude of cohort 
changes shown in the DFL decomposition is much larger than the effect of stock market decline 
found in Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2010b).  Hence, the evidence from DFL 
decomposition is consistent with the mean trend, and suggests the 2010 cohort likely will not be 
as financially prepared as the earlier cohorts upon retirement. 
VI. VALIDITY OF EARNINGS PROJECTION 
The HRS estimations of Social Security and DB wealth in the public release file relied on 
two assumptions about labor force participation and earnings.  To estimate the Social Security 
wealth, we assumed that: (a) the respondent stays in the labor force between the time the 
estimates were calculated and the time of retirement; and (b) the earnings profile stays on the 
same linear trajectory.19  More specifically, the HRS adopted and modified the earnings 
projection method in Mitchell, Olsen, and Steinmeier (2000).  The projected earnings in year T, 
YT, is a weighted average of earnings in the past five years: 
𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇 = (1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇) × 115��(6 − 𝑡𝑡) × 𝑌𝑌𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇−1𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡�5
𝑡𝑡=1
 
                                        
19 Although in this paper we only included the Social Security wealth based on the earnings history before 
respondents entered the HRS (and hence no need to impute earnings for those whom we have earnings records), for 
those with linked earnings records, projected earnings still is relevant because we do not have linked earnings 
records for every respondent.  For the respondents with no or incomplete earnings records, we used their imputed 
early retirement benefits (which were imputed with nearest neighbor matching, with the earnings among those who 
had linked earnings records projected through age 62) and prorated those numbers.  
CPIT is the change in consumer price index between year T-1 and year T.  AWI is the 
average wage index used by SSA to calculate Social Security benefits.  The projection was done 
iteratively until the age of retirement. 
To estimate pension wealth, we only relied on one earnings data point for each 
respondent (self-reported earnings in wave when pension wealth was estimated), so we imposed 
a more strict assumption that all respondents’ earnings profiles followed the same linear 
trajectory.  The nominal annual earnings growth used in 2004 was 4%. 
A. Earnings Projection and Social Security Wealth 
Using respondents with the linked earnings records, we examined the validity of earnings 
projection by comparing the actual/realized earnings versus the earnings that would have been 
projected in an earlier period based on our method.  To the extent that projected earnings were 
different from actual earnings, we also assessed the impact of errors in earnings projection on 
Social Security benefits. 
Figure X shows the earnings projection by the level of education.  In the top panel of 
Figure X, the solid lines are the (weighted) mean earnings by the level of education between 
1992 and 2003, for HRS respondents who were ages 51-56 in 1998 and whose SSA-linked 
earnings records were available through at least 2003.  We dropped those who never reported to 
be working between 1998 and 2003.  The dashed lines are the mean of earnings that were 
projected using earnings history up to 1997 (i.e., the earnings that would have been projected in 
1998).  The difference between solid and dashed lines of the same color represents the error in 
the earnings projection: the difference between actual earnings in 1998-2003 and the earnings 
that would have been projected in 1998 using linked earnings records through 1997.  The lower 
panel does the similar thing for the HRS cohort ages 51-56 in 2004, with the baseline year 
shifted six years from the top panel.  We do not yet have the linked data to construct a similar 
analysis for the 2010 HRS cohort. 
Figure X suggests that the errors in earnings projection for ages 57-62 were larger for the 
later cohort than the earlier cohort, likely due to the Great Recession.  While the 1998 projection 
worked pretty well, except for those who were high school graduates or less, the errors in the 
2004 projection were large across all education groups.  We also have tried some other variables 
in 2004; nevertheless, there did not seem to be a variable known/observed in 2004 that could 
strongly predict the size of projection error six years later.  Nevertheless, we need to point out 
that, by definition, earnings projection was only supposed to project the earnings, assuming the 
respondent stays in the same earnings trajectory until retirement and was not meant to “predict” 
major macroeconomic events. 
Figure XI follows a similar logic, but instead the respondents were categorized by 
whether they were working full time at the end of the 12-year period in each panel.  The earnings 
projection as of 1998 worked fine for those who were still working full time in 2004, as well as 
those who were not working in 2004.  However, the projection error was large for those who 
were working part-time in 2004.  The lower panel in Figure XI further splits the “working full 
time in 2004” group into same employer in 1998 and 2004 and different employer in 1998 and 
2004.  Overall, the quality of earnings projection was not related with whether the respondent 
changed employer or not during 1998 and 2004.  Nevertheless, Figure XI shows that the size of 
projection error increased when our underlying assumptions (that the respondent stayed in the 
labor force and on the linear earnings trajectory) did not hold.  While we cannot tell the nature of 
changing labor supply in this figure, the size of projection error due to changing labor supply 
will have a much larger impact on the analysis of retirement preparation if the reduction in labor 
supply is involuntary rather than voluntary. 
Figure XII is similar to Figure XI, except that it compares outcomes to 2010 with 2004 
projections.  However, in Figure XII, the effect of the Great Recession is pronounced.  The 
projected earnings were always lower than the actual earnings six years out, regardless whether 
the respondent was working full-time, part-time, or not working at all.  The further analysis in 
the lower panel of Figure XII shows that, when we split the respondents by whether they 
changed employers in 2004 and 2009, most of the projection errors were concentrated among 
those who changed employers.  Furthermore, those who were still working full-time but for 
different employers actually had similar pre-2004 earnings history as those who were not 
working in 2010, an indication of a significant level of involuntary reductions in labor supply 
among those who were not working in 2010. 
Hence, the earnings projection used to estimate Social Security wealth performed 
reasonably well among those who stayed in the same job during both periods.  It did not perform 
as well for the respondents who changed jobs.  Nonetheless, given the rationale of and 
underlying assumptions behind earnings projection, earnings changes due to job change and/or 
the Great Recession should be interpreted as negative shocks to the earnings rather than 
shortcomings of the earnings projection. 
How do the errors in earnings projection in Figures X through XII translate into our 
estimates of Social Security benefits wealth?  Theoretically, that depends on the level of earnings 
throughout earlier years of the life cycle.  Because the Social Security system is regressive, the 
impact of errors in earnings projection on benefits would be larger if, at the margin, the errors 
fall on the lowest segment of the AIME-PIA relationship (where the replacement rate is 0.9) than 
on the higher segments (where the replacement rates are 0.32 or 0.15). 
We used SSA’s ANYPIA program to calculate HRS respondents’ PIA at different 
retirement/quitting ages under actual and projected earnings profile.  Panel A of Table VII is the 
PIA of male HRS respondents who were ages 51-56 in 1998, calculated using (a) actual earnings 
through 1997 and projected earnings between 1998 and 2003, and (b) actual earnings through 
2003, assuming the respondents quit working in the end of 2003 and claimed old age benefits as 
soon as they became eligible at age 62.  Panel B of Table VII is the PIA of the same group 
calculated using (a) actual earnings through 1997 and projected earnings between 1998 and 
normal retirement age, and (b) actual earnings through 2003 and projected earnings between 
2004 and normal retirement age, assuming the respondents continued working and claimed the 
benefit when they hit the normal retirement age.  Panels C and D show the corresponding 
numbers for male HRS respondents ages 51-56 in 2004.  Hence, the difference across columns in 
Table VI reflects the effect of errors in earnings projection on PIA (and hence Social Security 
wealth, since any change in PIA would change wealth in the same proportion, everything else 
being equal) at retirement. 
For the 1998 cohort men, the benefit estimates based on projected earnings are not very 
different from those based on actual earnings.  The difference is less than 2% across all 
subgroups (Panels A and B in Table VII).  For the 2004 cohort men, the difference across 
columns is larger, especially for those who were not working in 2010.  The higher-than-actual 
projected earnings overstated the estimated Social Security wealth based on projected earnings 
for those who worked less than full time in 2010, and the magnitude of overstatement increased 
with claim age.  At the full retirement age, wealth estimates based on earnings records through 
2003 (and projected earnings after that) overstated the Social Security wealth by 5% among 
those who were not working in 2010.20 
Table VIII shows the same set of comparisons for female HRS respondents.  Panels A 
and B in Table VIII suggest that the projected earnings led to reasonably good estimates of 
Social Security wealth.  If anything, the earnings projection might have slightly understated 
women’s late career earnings.  It is also important to point out that, by staying in the labor 
market until the full retirement age (Panel B, compared to Panel A), women in the 1998 cohort 
were able to raise their lifetime earnings substantially (which likely reflected the lower level of 
labor force participation earlier in the career) and have significant gains in their Social Security 
wealth.  The effect of “catch-up” was smaller for the 2004 cohort (Panels C and D; however, the 
2004 cohort had higher level of wealth in the lower end of distribution than the 1998 cohort). 
The earnings projection, in general, slightly understated Social Security wealth for women wo 
were still working in 2010, but overstated for women who were not working in 2010. 
Overall, the earnings projection performed better for the 1998 cohort than the 2004 
cohort.  For the 2004 cohort, the earnings projection as of 2004 did not capture the negative 
earnings shocks many respondents experienced during the Great Recession.21  Nevertheless, 
except for the respondents who were not working as of 2010, the errors in earnings projection 
did not lead to very large bias in the estimation of Social Security wealth.  Among the HRS 
                                        
20 In this paper, we are namely concerned how the errors in earnings projection affect our estimate of retirement 
wealth.  An economic shock, positive or negative, could change retirement wealth not only though earnings (and 
hence DB and Social Security wealth), but also directly through the prices of other investments and household assets.  
This has been discussed in the literature (for example, see Gustman, et al., 2010b; Munnell and Rutledge, 2013) and 
is beyond the scope of our paper. 
21 It will be interesting to see how the earnings projection as of 2010, which was at the trough of the recession in 
terms of employment and earnings, compare against the eventual earnings profile and how this affects the estimation 
of Social Security wealth and retirement preparation.  We are not able to make such comparisons until the linked 
earnings records for more recent years become available. 
respondents who stayed with the same employer, projected earnings were very close to actual 
earnings, regardless the macroeconomic conditions.  Hence, the projection worked well for 
respondents whose labor supply was consistent with the “staying with the same employer until 
retirement” assumption in the earnings projection.  For the respondents whose labor supply 
deviated from that assumption, the effect of earnings projection errors on Social Security wealth 
was alleviated by the regressive schedule of Social Security benefit calculation.  Even in the 
worst-case scenario, the wealth estimate was only off by about 5% at the mean. 
B. Earnings Projection and Pension Wealth 
In theory, errors in earnings projection will have a larger effect on DB pension wealth.  
First, the formula to calculate DB wealth is not regressive, so any error in earnings projection 
will lead to the same change (percentage-wise) in DB wealth among the respondents who stayed 
with the same employers and whose plan provisions remained unchanged.  Second, DB wealth 
formula is usually back-loaded; for respondents who switched jobs, they would not only miss the 
“kinks” in the benefits formula had they stayed in the same job but also start at lower segment of 
the benefit formula in the new job.  If the job change was accompanied with lower-than-
projected salaries or if the respondent quit earlier than expected, the respondent’s DB wealth 
could be significantly overstated. 
Since the Pension Wealth Estimation program relied on the earnings at the baseline wave 
to project the earnings at various retirement timings, it assumed the earnings growth was the 
same across the sample and over time.  Summary statistics of actual 2004 earnings (from the 
2004 pension wealth estimates data), projected 2010 earnings (based on actual 2004 earnings), 
and actual 2010 earnings (from the 2010 pension wealth estimates data) are listed in Table IX.  
In 2004, only those who had coded pension plans had projected 2010 earnings in the Pension 
Wealth Estimation program output.22  Overall, among those who stayed in the same job, earnings 
projection as of 2004 overshot by 10% for men and 15% for women at the mean.23  The earnings 
projection error was smaller for respondents in the private sector than those in the public sector.  
Projection errors in earnings for those who left their 2004 employer (either for a different 
employer in 2010 or out of work) were even larger.  Figure XIII show the distribution of 
earnings projection errors.  A vertical line was drawn where the annual growth equals 4%.  In 
2004, the HRS assumed a nominal earnings growth rate of 4% each year, but most respondents 
experienced slower earnings growth between 2004 and 2010.  A comparison of actual earnings 
data between 2004 and 2010 suggests the earnings growth was only about 2.5%. 
In Table X, we show how the earnings projection errors in Table IX affected pension 
wealth.  Due to the small number of respondents whose plans were coded in both 2004 and 2010, 
the point estimates were a bit noisy.  Numbers in the first column are the age 65 DB wealth 
estimates as of 2004, inflated to 2010 U.S. dollars.  DB wealth estimates as of 2010 are reported 
in the second and third columns, which have slightly different meanings across rows.  Numbers 
in the second column are the wealth estimates accrued when the respondents left their 2004 job, 
evaluated at the year of job separation and inflated to 2010 U.S. dollars.  Hence, the difference 
between the first two columns reflects the wealth loss due to early separation from the job.  
Numbers in the third column are the age 65 DB wealth estimates as of 2010 for the 2010 job, 
which would be the same jobs for those who stayed with the same employer, but new 2010 jobs 
for those who changed employers.  The sum of the second and third columns hence reflects the 
                                        
22 Rather than feeding earnings into imputed plans (as in 2010), in 2004 HRS imputed the wealth directly for those 
whose plans were not matched and coded. 
23 Part of the big errors at the mean is driven by a few outliers (see Figure XIII).  At the median, the error is about 
5% for both genders. 
DB wealth estimates as of 2010.  The final column is the difference between wealth estimates in 
2004 and 2010, and reflects how pension wealth estimates were affected by earnings projection 
errors and/or job changes. 
Numbers in Table X show that, DB wealth in 2010 was 10% to 20% lower than in 2004 
among those who stayed in the same public sector job.  Since these respondents (ages 57-62 in 
2010) were much closer to retirement in 2010, there may not be enough time for their earnings to 
get back to the level projected in 2004.  Hence, while the comparison is relative rather than 
absolute, it is more likely that the 2004 wealth was overstated than the other way around (that the 
2010 wealth was understated).   For both men and women in the same private sector jobs, DB 
wealth increased at the mean.  However, this is driven by a few outliers at the lower end of the 
distribution in 2004.  The median and trimmed-mean (excluding the outliers) wealth stayed 
roughly at the same level across the two periods, reflecting the smaller earnings projection errors 
for this group of HRS respondents (see Table IX). 
We suspect there could be some self-selection among those who changed employers: 
whether respondents quit their 2004 job voluntarily or not may be correlated with how their DB 
wealth compared in 2004 and 2010.  The group that quit their 2004 pension job and had a non-
pension job clearly saw a big reduction in wealth.  For the other two groups who quit their 
pension job in 2004, the wealth difference was smaller relative to the level of wealth.  Although 
in theory HRS respondents could miss the “kinks” in back-loaded pension plans by quitting early, 
it is also likely that some respondents might have plans from their career jobs in which the 
maximum return occurred at about age 60.  In this latter scenario, the respondents would be 
better off just quitting the 2004 job before 2010 (taking either early retirement or vested-deferred 
option) rather than staying until age 65, especially among those who already had long job tenure.  
They still would receive similar or even higher wealth (measured in present discount value) from 
the 2004 job, with an option to take a new job as the transition into retirement.  Unfortunately, 
due to the small sample size, we do not have enough statistical power to test such hypothesis.  
The fact that women who quit their jobs before 2010 on average lose pension wealth is 
nevertheless consistent with this selection mechanism, as women in this cohort tend to have 
shorter tenure due to the interruptions in their labor market participation. 
Table XI shows the wealth estimates at the expected retirement age.  The expected 
retirement age may differ across respondents, across jobs for the same respondent, and may even 
differ over time within the same respondent-job.  The patterns are largely the same as in Table X, 
but the magnitudes of errors are smaller.  Possible explanations are that the variations in kinks of 
the benefit schedules are reflected in subjective expectations of retirement age, and respondents 
may also change expected retirement age to compensate the benefit loss. 
To summarize, the earnings projection in pension wealth estimation as of 2004 overstated 
the actual earnings in 2010, even among those who had the same job.  This led to lower pension 
wealth estimates in 2010 than in 2004, especially among the male public sector employees, by 
about 10%.  The effect of earnings projection error on pension wealth among job switchers is 
theoretically ambiguous.  The effect may be negative if respondents miss the “kinks” in the back-
loaded pension plan by quitting early and start new jobs at lower earnings.  However, for those 
who already had long seniority and hit the maximum return in the pension plan, they may receive 
similar or higher total pension wealth if they retired before 2010 than stayed in the same job until 
age 65.  The error in earnings projection will have much smaller impact for such respondents.  
This leads to a hypothesis that the effect of earnings projection error on wealth among job 
switchers depend on whether the job separation is voluntary.  We do not have enough statistical 
power to test such hypothesis due to the small number of respondents whose plans were coded in 
2004 and 2010. 
C. Comparing Two Methods of Earning Projection 
The earnings projection for Social Security wealth estimation relied on individual-
specific earnings trajectory based on earnings history, and the earnings projection for pension 
wealth estimation relied on a fixed earnings growth rate across all individuals.  The former 
allows variations in earnings growth rate both across individuals and over time; the latter does 
not allow such variation, but is much easier to implement (each researcher can use her own 
assumption).  Additionally, the earnings projection in pension wealth estimation requires much 
less data—it only requires one data point per respondent, while the individual-based projection 
requires the earnings history and, hence, cannot be directly implemented for the respondents 
whose Social Security earnings are not available.24 
Based on our findings in Sections VI.A, the earnings projection based on linked Social 
Security earnings performed pretty well among those who stayed with the same employer.  The 
errors were larger for those who switched jobs or quit from the labor market.  However, the 
motivation behind the earnings projection is to estimate the retirement wealth based on the 
assumption that the respondent stays in the same job until the retirement age.  The earnings 
changes due to job changes and/or the Great Recession should hence be more appropriately 
                                        
24 For the purpose of wealth estimation, there are two solutions for those whose earnings records were unavailable or 
incomplete.  The first is to impute wealth directly based on earnings reported in the HRS as well as other individual 
and job characteristics, as the HRS has done.  The second is to impute earnings history based on the earnings 
reported in the HRS and a hypothesized earnings profile (for example, using the parameters and profiles identified in 
Guvenen (2009) or Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2015)), then use the imputed earnings history to calculate 
wealth. 
considered as shocks to the earnings trajectory rather than the shortcoming in the earnings 
projection method itself. 
Section VI.B suggests the projection based on one data point and a homogenous earnings 
growth rate tend to have bigger errors.  Even for the respondents who stayed in the same job 
between 2004 and 2010, the projection errors are larger than those in the projections using Social 
Security earnings records.  Nevertheless, it does not mean this method is necessarily inferior.  
This method is easier to implement and requires much less data.  Furthermore, this method 
would have performed equally well, at least at the mean, had the earnings growth rate been set at 
2.5% rather than 4% in 2004.  Hence, for researchers who do not have access to the restricted 
Social Security earnings data, using a linear projection with a universal earnings growth rate can 
still lead to satisfactory results, especially if a set of sensitivity analysis is performed based on a 
reasonable range of earnings growth rates rather than just one fixed assumption. 
The selection of earnings projection likely depends on the research question, method, and 
whether the researcher has access to restricted Social Security earnings data.  Each method has 
its pros and cons, so there will be a trade-off depending on the context.  For example, although 
the projection that relied on Social Security earnings history performed better, this method may 
significantly complicate the computation in a structural model type of setting due to the 
additional state variables required to keep track of past earnings.  On the other hand, the 
projection that assumes a universal earnings growth rate can be implemented in a much easier 
manner. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper intended to answer three questions.  First, how do the newly available data 
sources enrich our understanding about the pension wealth held by HRS respondents and 
improve our assessment of retirement wealth?  Second, how does the improved data inform 
about the financial preparedness for retirement among Americans from the middle of the baby 
boom?  Third, how much does the estimation of retirement wealth depend on the assumption 
about earnings projection? 
The newly available plan information publicly available from the Department of Labor’s 
Form 5500 database enabled us to better capture the provisions of pension plans in the private 
sector.  We were able to match almost 90% of DB plans that HRS respondents who worked in 
the private sector reported to have, in addition to virtually all the DB plans in the public sector.  
The decision to code all the plans that can be matched was justified by the substantial variation 
in plan wealth both across and within sectors, holding individual and job characteristics constant.  
Public plans tend to provide higher levels of benefits.  Plans in the private sector that were frozen 
or taken over by PBGC had lower levels of benefits compared to other private sector plans.  
Hence, the newly available plan information improved our understanding of retirement wealth in 
three ways: It reduced the need for imputation, it captured the variation in plan generosity, and it 
allowed us to identify plans not reported in the survey.   We found that most the pension wealth 
was associated with plans where the self-report and Form 5500 data were consistent.  Wealth in 
plans where self-report and Form 5500 data did not agree were relatively small.  Additionally, 
the linked W-2 earnings records also provided information on DC plan participation.  Combining 
all these data sources, we concluded that about 10% of pension wealth was missed from the self-
report in the HRS. 
We also documented the cohort changes in pension wealth over time.  Overall, retirement 
wealth has declined after the turn of the century, in both absolute and relative (to lifetime 
earnings) terms.  The magnitude of decline was larger than what can be explained by report error 
or the effect of Great Recession, suggesting the near-elderly population in the recent cohort was 
not as financially prepared as their earlier peers when approaching retirement.  The shift from 
DB plans to DC plans and/or IRA has, on average, reduced the retirement wealth, as the gain in 
DC/IRA has not been enough to offset the loss in DB wealth.  As a result, Social Security wealth 
was also becoming a bigger component of retirement wealth for recent cohorts, especially among 
the minority.  From the policy perspective, this indicates the solvency of the Social Security 
system could potentially have more severe consequences on those financially vulnerable. 
Finally, we compared the earnings projections methods used to estimate Social Security 
and pension wealth.  The earnings projection used for Social Security wealth requires linked W-2 
earnings history, and allows individual heterogeneity in earnings growth, as well as variations in 
earnings growth over time.  The earnings projection used for pension wealth only requires one 
data point for each respondent and assumes one universal earnings growth rate.  We found that 
the first method worked reasonably well among those who stayed in the same job.  The 
projection errors were larger among those who switched jobs.  The second method, on average, 
slightly overstated future earnings, at least in 2004.  However, while this method may be subject 
to larger errors potentially, it can be compensated by estimating the results of interest using a 
range of reasonable earnings growth rates as a sensitivity analysis.  The choice of earnings 
projection method hence depends on the context of the research setting, such as the research 
question itself (Is earnings projection the end or just the means to obtain another set of result?), 
access to restricted data (does the researcher have access to the linked earnings history?  How 
many cases have no or incomplete earnings history and require imputation?), and the research 
method used (Does the method have the capacity to include the full earnings history or can only 
accommodate a certain earnings process with given parameters?).  
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Figure IX: DFL Decomposition 
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Table I:  Components of Full Wealth for Individuals Ages 51-56, by Year (2010 USD) 
Year 1992 1998 2004 2010 
Social Security Wealth $104,139 $104,154 $120,166 $127,313 
DB $109,856 $108,086 $60,549 $35,881 
DC $22,152 $38,497 $35,711 $44,675 
IRA $15,147 $26,409 $30,395 $26,238 
Other Household Wealth/Assets $176,744 $177,530 $217,082 $179,699 
Total $428,035 $454,676 $463,903 $413,806 
Note: Numbers are weighted means, in 2010 US Dollars. 
 
  
Table II: Donor versus Seeker of DB Plans 
Self-Report 
Employer Plan Description 
DB Only DC Only Both/Combo Not Matched 
DB Only Donor Seeker Donora Seeker 
DC Only Donorb N/A Donora;b N/A 
Both/Combo Donor Seeker Donor Seeker 
DK Only Seeker N/A Seeker Seeker 
a: Only the DB component of the plan is used as a donor plan. 
b: The coded plan from project work is used as a donor, but the respondent will not be 
assigned a DB wealth from this plan. 
  
Table III:  Employer Plan Match Rates by Sector & Self-Reported Plan Type, 2004 & 2010 
Sector Plan Type 2004 2010 
Private 
All 31.6% 87.9% 
Any DB 33.6% 88.4% 
Public 
All 88.2% 96.9% 
Any DB 92.1% 98.3% 
 
  
Table IV:  Comparison between Pension Estimates Based on Coded and Imputed Plans 
 PV at 65, as of 
2004 




Number of Obs. 
Public, Coded 04 & 10 $242,433 $256,090 $59,997 113 
Private, Coded 04 & 10 $144,224 $177,168 $90,064 24 
Private, Coded 10 Only $169,527 $115,520 $131,308 51 
Note: Numbers are weighted means, in 2010 US Dollars. 
  
Table V:  Pension Wealth on Current Job by Plan Type; Respondent Report Compared to 
Employer Match, All Workers in HRS 2010 ($000s) 
 DB Wealth DC Wealth Total Wealth 
Plan Type 
Agreement 
Respondent Employer Respondent Employer Respondent Employer 
Agree $139,964 $139,964 $201,160 $201,160 $341,123 $340,654 
Switch $13,698 $14,579 $7,085 $20,437 $20,783 $35,016 
Drop Plan $40,468 $28,624 $40,128 $22,565 $80,596 $51,189 
Add Plan $69,856 $116,006 $83,706 $140,579 $153,562 $256,585 
Total $263,986 $299,173 $332,079 $384,740 $596,065 $683,913 
Note: Numbers are total wealth reported by all HRS respondents with current job 
pensions in 2010, in 2010 US Dollars. 
  
Table VI: Additional DC Plans Inferred by Deferred Compensation in W-2 Records ($000s) 
Plan Type 
Agreement 
Respondent Employer % DC in W-2 Value Adj.  Value 
Agree 
DB Only DB Only 11.7% $1,641 $3,200 
DC Only DC Only 77.3% 0 0 
Both Both 73.5% 0 0 
Type switch 
DB DC 54.3% 0 0 
DC DB 33.8% $10 $20 
Lose a plan 
Both DB 62.5% $5,403 $10,535 
Both DC 80.3% 0 0 
Add a plan 
DB Both 40.1% 0 0 
DC Both 62.8% 0 0 
All Others   13.2% $6,751 $13,164 
Total    $13,805 $26,918 




Table VII:  PIA in 2010 USD under Various Earnings Projection Rules, Men 
Panel A: 1998 Cohort (Age 51-56 in 1998), Quit Working in the End of 2003 
 Actual through 1997 + 
Projected through 2003 
Actual through 2003 
Not Working in 2003 (38) $1,210 $1,187 
Working PT in 2003 (16) $1,736 $1,772 
Working FT in 2003, Diff.  Job 
(53) 
$1,617 $1,601 
Working FT in 2003, Same Job 
(122) 
$1,667 $1,661 
Panel B: 1998 Cohort (Age 51-56 in 1998), Quit Working at Full Retirement Age 
 Actual through 1997 + 
Projected through FRA 
Actual through 2003 + 
Projected through FRA 
Not Working in 2003 (38) $1,463 $1,491 
Working PT in 2003 (16) $1,534 $1,530 
Working FT in 2003, Diff.  Job 
(53) 
$1,718 $1.699 
Working FT in 2003, Same Job 
(122) 
$1,778 $1,789 
Panel C: 2004 Cohort (Age 51-56 in 2004), Quit Working in the End of 2009 
 Actual through 2003 + 
Projected through 2009 
Actual through 2009 
Not Working in 2009 (165) $1,572 $1,545 
Working PT in 2009 (33) $1,417 $1,399 
Working FT in 2009, Diff.  Job 
(112) 
$1,601 $1,598 




Panel D: 2004 Cohort (Age 51-56 in 2004), Quit Working at Full Retirement Age 
 Actual through 2003 + 
Projected through FRA 
Actual through 2009 + 
Projected through FRA 
Not Working in 2009 (165) $1,657 $1,574 
Working PT in 2009 (33) $1,420 $1,393 
Working FT in 2009, Diff.  Job 
(112) 
$1,639 $1,634 
Working FT in 2009, Same Job 
(251) 
$1,714 $1,718 
Notes: Numbers are weighted means, in 2010 US Dollars.  Sample size is in the 
parenthesis in the first column of each row.  
Table VIII:  PIA in 2010 USD under Various Earnings Projection Rules, Women 
Panel A: 1998 Cohort (Age 51-56 in 1998), Quit Working in the End of 2003 
 Actual through 1997 + 
Projected through 2003 
Actual through 2003 
Not Working in 2003 (94) $463 $453 
Working PT in 2003 (56) $736 $742 
Working FT in 2003, Diff.  Job 
(66) 
$1,279 $1,299 
Working FT in 2003, Same Job 
(119) 
$1,217 $1,230 
Panel B: 1998 Cohort (Age 51-56 in 1998), Quit Working at Full Retirement Age 
 Actual through 1997 + 
Projected through FRA 
Actual through 2003 + 
Projected through FRA 
Not Working in 2003 (94) $790 $728 
Working PT in 2003 (56) $956 $941 
Working FT in 2003, Diff.  Job 
(66) 
$1,144 $1,190 
Working FT in 2003, Same Job 
(119) 
$1,346 $1,375 
Panel C: 2004 Cohort (Age 51-56 in 2004), Quit Working in the End of 2009 
 Actual through 2003 + 
Projected through 2009 
Actual through 2009 
Not Working in 2009 (186) $1,023 $995 
Working PT in 2009 (104) $1,021 $1,004 
Working FT in 2009, Diff.  Job 
(95) 
$1,214 $1,213 




Panel D: 2004 Cohort (Age 51-56 in 2004), Quit Working at Full Retirement Age 
 Actual through 2003 + 
Projected through FRA 
Actual through 2009 + 
Projected through FRA 
Not Working in 2009 (186) $1,083 $980 
Working PT in 2009 (104) $1,079 $1,040 
Working FT in 2009, Diff.  Job 
(95) 
$1,294 $1,296 
Working FT in 2009, Same Job 
(238) 
$1,325 $1,346 
Notes: Numbers are weighted means, in 2010 US Dollars.  Sample size is in the 




Table IX:  Earning Projection Used in Pension Wealth Estimation 
Panel A: Men, Age 51-56 in 2004, Plan Coded in 2004 
 Actual 2004 Earnings Projected 2010 Earnings Actual 2010 Earnings 
Same Employer, Public (43) $73,565 $80,704 $74,005 
Same Employer, Private (15) $73,747 $80,903 $76,327 
Different Employer, w/ Pension in 2010 Job (6) $59,148 $64,887 $51,075 
Different Employer , No Pension in 2010 Job (27) $73,698 $80,850 $41,673 
Not Working in 2010 (32) $76,742 $84,819 — 
Panel B: Women, Age 51-56 in 2004, Plan Coded in 2004 
 Actual 2004 Earnings Projected 2010 Earnings Actual 2010 Earnings 
Same Employer, Public (70) $69,159 $75,870 $65,681 
Same Employer, Private (9) $69,569 $76,319 $73,076 
Different Employer, w/ Pension in 2010 Job (7) $58,165 $63,809 $57,266 
Different Employer , No Pension in 2010 Job (27) $60,579 $66,019 $20,536 
Not Working in 2010 (55) $59,545 $65,323 — 




Table X:  Estimated Pension Wealth at Age 65 
Panel A: Men, Age 51-56 in 2004, Plan Coded in 2004 
 Wealth in 2004  Wealth in 2010 Difference 
 2004 Job  2004 Job 2010 Job  
Same Employer, Public (43) $383,880  — $318,907 ($64,943) 
Same Employer, Private (15) $209,469  — $242,438 $32,969 
Different Employer, w/ Pension in 2010 Job (6) $274,614  $277,631 $49,026 $52,301 
Different Employer , No Pension in 2010 Job (27) $349,872  $259,038 — ($90,834) 
Not Working in 2010 (32) $398,643  $401,962 — $7,098 
Panel B: Women, Age 51-56 in 2004, Plan Coded in 2004 
 Wealth in 2004  Wealth in 2010 Difference 
 2004 Job  2004 Job 2010 Job  
Same Employer, Public (70) $363,648  — $337,585 ($26,063) 
Same Employer, Private (9) $125,651  — $209,880 $84,229 
Different Employer, w/ Pension in 2010 Job (7) $220,628  $48,644 $73,045 ($98,938) 
Different Employer , No Pension in 2010 Job (27) $362,616  $238,163 — ($124,453) 
Not Working in 2010 (55) $368,993  $329,582 — ($39,411) 
Note: Numbers are weighted means, in 2010 US Dollars.  Sample size is in the parenthesis in the first column of each row. 
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Table XI:  Estimated Pension Wealth at Expected Retirement Age 
Panel A: Men, Age 51-56 in 2004, Plan Coded in 2004 
 Wealth in 2004  Wealth in 2010 Difference 
 2004 Job  2004 Job 2010 Job  
Same Employer, Public (43) $364,624  — $334,469 ($30,155) 
Same Employer, Private (15) $210,893  — $254,469 $43,576 
Different Employer, w/ Pension in 2010 Job (6) $295,171  $277,631 $63,093 $45,553 
Different Employer , No Pension in 2010 Job (27) $344,196  $259,038 — ($85,128) 
Not Working in 2010 (32) $420,443  $401,962 — ($18,481) 
Panel B: Women, Age 51-56 in 2004, Plan Coded in 2004 
 Wealth in 2004  Wealth in 2010 Difference 
 2004 Job  2004 Job 2010 Job  
Same Employer, Public (70) $351,935  — $340,257 ($11,678) 
Same Employer, Private (9) $122,701  — $203,605 $80,964 
Different Employer, w/ Pension in 2010 Job (7) $223,235  $48,644 $61,249 ($113,340) 
Different Employer , No Pension in 2010 Job (27) $356,340  $238,163 —  ($118,177) 
Not Working in 2010 (55) $334,286  $329,582 — ($4,074) 




Appendix Table I: Indexed Lifetime Earnings (2010 USD) 
 Year Cohort Ages 51-56 
 1992 1998 2004 2010 
Decile of Lifetime Earnings     
1 $27,126 $51,191 $81,900 $111,963 
2 $131,911 $223,320 $272,480 $315,819 
3 $264,237 $412,699 $453,603 $490,714 
4 $437,322 $627,088 $650,849 $680,506 
5 $628,228 $842,168 $864,946 $867,344 
6 $858,985 $1,057,339 $1,100,897 $1,091,817 
7 $1,108,439 $1,308,172 $1,373,018 $1,344,237 
8 $1,398,342 $1,616,077 $1,723,779 $1,685,097 
9 $1,715,082 $1,964,248 $2,166,316 $2,147,036 
10 $2,683,359 $2,814,238 $3,333,826 $3,701,822 
1-5 $297,765 $431,293 $464,755 $493,269 
6-10 $1,552,841 $1,752,015 $1,939,567 $1,994,002 
White $983,212 $1,151,508 $1,293,106 $1,359,806 
African American $697,260 $867,759 $915,770 $906,447 
Hispanic $562,662 $701,851 $696,934 $758,934 
Male $1,431,242 $1,561,473 $1,627,345 $1,544,128 
Female $465,973 $660,840 $797,028 $964,051 
All $924,895 $1,091,014 $1,201,307 $1,242,987 
No. of Observations 5,579 3,078 3,368 4,780 
Notes: Lifetime earnings up to date of cohort entry into HRS are indexed on the Social 
Security wage index up to that date of cohort entry.  They are then converted to 2010 USD using 
CPI.  
Appendix Table II: Social Security Wealth (2010 USD) 
 Year Cohort Ages 51-56 
 1992 1998 2004 2010 
Decile of Lifetime Earnings     
1 $31,083 $34,182 $44,321 $32,756 
2 $43,046 $55,644 $65,820 $67,835 
3 $65,836 $74,690 $84,286 $85,718 
4 $86,207 $91,305 $100,620 $99,144 
5 $101,538 $102,739 $114,361 $119,533 
6 $115,420 $113,238 $128,452 $131,692 
7 $127,775 $127,785 $142,972 $150,876 
8 $141,020 $137,412 $159,462 $175,493 
9 $158,364 $146,579 $175,523 $195,287 
10 $171,280 $158,289 $186,198 $215,132 
1-5 $65,542 $71,712 $81,882 $80,997 
6-10 $142,772 $136,661 $158,521 $173,696 
White $107,858 $107,880 $126,255 $134,162 
African American $91,472 $91,693 $101,362 $110,150 
Hispanic $78,395 $78,464 $86,539 $96,100 
Male $126,018 $120,532 $133,344 $140,019 
Female $84,308 $89,179 $107,660 $115,543 
All $104,139 $104,154 $120,166 $127,313 
No. of Observations 5,579 3,078 3,368 4,780 
Notes: Social Security wealth is estimated based only on earnings up to the date of cohort 
entry into HRS.  Values are converted to 2010 USD using CPI. 
  
Appendix Table III: Proportions Receiving SSDI 
 Year Cohort Ages 51-56 
 1992 1998 2004 2010 
Decile of Lifetime Earnings     
1 3.1% 4.9% 10.1% 8.0% 
2 3.9% 6.5% 10.8% 13.4% 
3 7.2% 7.4% 7.3% 16.8% 
4 5.1% 7.7% 9.3% 15.4% 
5 4.9% 8.0% 9.4% 7.6% 
6 4.9% 4.8% 5.3% 8.3% 
7 3.0% 3.1% 2.4% 3.3% 
8 2.3% 2.4% 2.1% 0.6% 
9 1.2% 0.6% 1.4% 2.1% 
10 0.3% 0.0% 0.5% 0.8% 
1-5 4.8% 6.9% 9.4% 12.2% 
6-10 2.3% 2.2% 2.3% 3.0% 
White 3.0% 3.9% 5.3% 6.5% 
African American 7.6% 9.0% 9.8% 16.2% 
Hispanic 4.6% 5.4% 6.7% 6.3% 
Male 4.5% 5.2% 6.5% 7.5% 
Female 2.8% 3.9% 5.2% 7.7% 
All 3.6% 4.6% 5.9% 7.6% 
No. of Observations 5,579 3,078 3,368 4,780 
Notes: SSDI receipt is based on respondent self-report data summarized in the RAND 
user-friendly file, not on program information received from SSA 
  
Appendix Table IV: Non-Retirement Wealth (2010 USD) 
 Year Cohort Ages 51-56 
 1992 1998 2004 2010 
Decile of Lifetime Earnings     
1 $142,475 $129,459 $93,859 $107,521 
2 $153,077 $176,984 $162,834 $127,967 
3 $143,038 $154,204 $152,117 $109,019 
4 $133,557 $153,828 $128,321 $112,537 
5 $161,920 $169,977 $192,924 $121,819 
6 $158,543 $136,885 $182,095 $124,465 
7 $155,174 $155,742 $183,174 $183,913 
8 $168,833 $160,426 $228,927 $138,149 
9 $194,403 $193,418 $265,935 $294,886 
10 $356,829 $344,852 $581,767 $477,003 
1-5 $146,813 $156,890 $146,011 $115,773 
6-10 $206,756 $198,265 $288,380 $243,683 
White $201,437 $201,202 $247,268 $213,599 
African American $57,248 $59,361 $77,481 $50,308 
Hispanic $56,268 $66,523 $107,181 $74,181 
Male $185,430 $170,291 $234,501 $175,990 
Female $168,870 $184,150 $200,553 $183,134 
All $176,744 $177,530 $217,082 $179,699 
No. of Observations 5,579 3,078 3,368 4,780 
Notes: Non-retirement wealth is all household wealth, excluding IRAs, DC plans, and 
without augmentation for wealth value of annuity benefits received or scheduled.  It is based on 
the RAND HxATOTB variable.  For married and partnered couples, total household wealth was 
split evenly between partners.  Values are converted to 2010 USD using CPI. 
  
Appendix Table V: IRA Wealth (Individual, 2010 USD) 
 Year Cohort Ages 51-56 
 1992 1998 2004 2010 
Decile of Lifetime Earnings     
1 $3,501 $4,784 $6,968 $14,325 
2 $5,539 $17,590 $12,634 $10,534 
3 $5,115 $13,570 $22,425 $17,415 
4 $7,964 $13,920 $12,810 $14,093 
5 $9,738 $18,396 $23,317 $17,901 
6 $12,775 $16,701 $28,767 $15,818 
7 $11,648 $23,960 $24,376 $25,745 
8 $18,318 $27,502 $25,628 $23,820 
9 $21,612 $42,508 $43,673 $39,392 
10 $55,351 $85,330 $103,621 $83,419 
1-5 $6,371 $13,652 $15,631 $14,854 
6-10 $23,941 $39,200 $45,213 $37,639 
White $17,496 $30,580 $35,656 $31,187 
African American $3,968 $4,997 $7,338 $6,600 
Hispanic $3,415 $7,635 $9,688 $11,654 
Male $20,507 $32,228 $36,243 $28,828 
Female $10,289 $21,088 $24,846 $23,839 
All $15,147 $26,409 $30,395 $26,238 
No. of Observations 5,579 3,078 3,368 4,780 
Notes: IRA wealth is allocated between individuals based on the report of ownership 
given in HRS.  Values are converted to 2010 USD using CPI. 
  
Appendix Table VI: DB Pension Wealth (2010 USD) 
 Year Cohort Ages 51-56 
 1992 1998 2004 2010 
Decile of Lifetime Earnings     
1 $19,666 $10,999 $16,380 $4,950 
2 $11,676 $14,572 $14,911 $15,132 
3 $19,385 $28,501 $26,255 $21,277 
4 $36,347 $40,042 $24,338 $13,337 
5 $73,252 $55,690 $27,265 $16,758 
6 $83,281 $73,583 $61,189 $28,192 
7 $133,759 $148,149 $88,997 $44,767 
8 $188,748 $178,068 $87,582 $61,683 
9 $206,429 $228,428 $129,568 $56,809 
10 $326,427 $303,601 $129,446 $96,200 
1-5 $32,065 $29,961 $21,830 $14,291 
6-10 $187,729 $186,366 $99,356 $57,530 
White $115,798 $113,473 $63,764 $39,794 
African American $106,652 $94,111 $56,124 $23,343 
Hispanic $44,483 $65,509 $36,057 $20,108 
Male $167,417 $152,709 $65,714 $37,059 
Female $57,688 $67,282 $55,646 $34,836 
All $109,856 $108,086 $60,549 $35,895 
No. of Observations 5,579 3,078 3,368 4,780 
Notes: DB wealth on current jobs is estimated using methods described in text.  It is the 
prorated value of DB wealth projected at future retirement ages.  DB wealth on past jobs is taken 
from data underlying Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2010a).  Values are converted to 
2010 USD using CPI. 
  
Appendix Table VII: DC Pension Wealth (2010 USD) 
 Year Cohort Ages 51-56 
 1992 1998 2004 2010 
Decile of Lifetime Earnings     
1 $3,327 $4,727 $4,862 $4,877 
2 $2,192 $9,443 $7,208 $5,926 
3 $3,715 $13,058 $7,410 $18,255 
4 $4,134 $16,006 $19,903 $11,784 
5 $8,205 $24,268 $16,044 $21,523 
6 $9,319 $21,969 $24,548 $31,143 
7 $15,439 $37,818 $42,733 $47,798 
8 $26,068 $43,760 $44,423 $58,331 
9 $42,048 $62,989 $60,612 $111,226 
10 $107,273 $151,265 $129,681 $150,836 
1-5 $4,315 $13,500 $11,085 $12,473 
6-10 $40,029 $63,560 $60,399 $79,867 
White $24,802 $42,861 $39,351 $54,351 
African American $8,816 $16,889 $27,220 $18,159 
Hispanic $9,948 $17,795 $12,237 $16,483 
Male $37,668 $54,496 $48,941 $61,078 
Female $8,091 $23,869 $23,155 $32,322 
All $22,152 $38,497 $35,711 $46,147 
No. of Observations 5,579 3,078 3,368 4,780 
Notes: DC wealth is taken from self-report, with imputations for missing data.  These 
estimates are not augmented by plans not reported by the respondent.  Values are converted to 
2010 USD using CPI. 
  
Appendix Table VIII: Total Retirement Wealth (2010 USD) 
 Year Cohort Ages 51-56 
 1992 1998 2004 2010 
Decile of Lifetime Earnings     
1 $57,577 $54,692 $72,531 $56,908 
2 $62,453 $97,249 $100,573 $99,427 
3 $94,051 $129,819 $140,376 $142,665 
4 $134,652 $161,273 $157,671 $138,357 
5 $192,733 $201,093 $180,987 $175,715 
6 $220,795 $225,491 $242,956 $206,846 
7 $288,621 $337,712 $299,078 $269,185 
8 $374,154 $386,742 $317,095 $319,327 
9 $428,453 $480,504 $409,376 $402,714 
10 $660,331 $698,485 $548,946 $545,587 
1-5 $108,293 $128,825 $130,428 $122,614 
6-10 $394,471 $425,787 $363,490 $348,732 
White $265,954 $294,794 $265,026 $259,494 
African American $210,908 $207,690 $192,044 $158,252 
Hispanic $136,241 $169,403 $144,521 $144,346 
Male $351,610 $359,965 $284,242 $266,985 
Female $160,376 $201,418 $211,307 $206,540 
All $251,294 $277,146 $246,821 $235,593 
No. of Observations 5,579 3,078 3,368 4,780 
Note: Total retirement wealth is the sum of IRA, DB, and DC wealth as reported in 
Appendix Tables 5, 6, and 7.  Values are converted to 2010 USD using CPI. 
  
Appendix Table IX: Total Retirement Wealth as Share of Lifetime Earnings 
 Year Cohort Ages 51-56 
 1992 1998 2004 2010 
Decile of Lifetime Earnings     
1     
2 0.47 0.44 0.37 0.31 
3 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.29 
4 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.20 
5 0.31 0.24 0.21 0.20 
6 0.26 0.21 0.22 0.19 
7 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.20 
8 0.27 0.24 0.18 0.19 
9 0.25 0.24 0.19 0.19 
10 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.15 
1-5 0.36 0.30 0.28 0.25 
6-10 0.25 0.24 0.19 0.17 
White 0.27 0.26 0.20 0.19 
African American 0.30 0.24 0.21 0.17 
Hispanic 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.19 
Male 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.17 
Female 0.34 0.30 0.27 0.21 
All 0.27 0.25 0.21 0.19 
No. of Observations 5,579 3,078 3,368 4,780 
Notes: The ratio of retirement wealth to lifetime earnings is the ratio of Appendix Table 
VIII to Appendix Table I.   
 
